Army Doctrine for Know How You Are Percevied by Others
Executive Summary
Originally touted as a reformer when elected, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has presided over a menses of democratic regression and increasing illiberalism. During his tenure it appears that the armed forces is gaining greater ground in the ceremonious-military balance, marked by the date of several New Gild figures in politics, increased reliance on the ground forces's territorial arrangement, and a greater ability for retired officers to shape public discourse and policy. The public's perceptions of the war machine as a trusted and legitimate actor in politics gives them further leverage in the face up of waning support for liberal democratic principles. This situation of the military'southward de facto "dual function" has been intensified past the onset of COVID-nineteen, necessitating the deployment of armed services forces to enforce health protocols. This trend will be hard to opposite. Therefore, strengthening institutions, particularly a strong civilian bureaucracy, costless and active press, independent courts, and fair elections, will exist critical in rolling back some of the illiberalism in Republic of indonesia'southward democracy.
Indonesia'due south democracy: from reformasi to regression
In that location is now scholarly consensus that Indonesia'south republic has non just stagnated but is regressing. While Republic of indonesia'due south republic might have appeared durable, over the past five years, the nascent signs of regression under the Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi) administration have gathered greater shape. In September last year, student groups organized massive protests in major capital cities confronting the government's proposed revisions to the criminal code which would accept criminalized extramarital sex, most forms of abortion, and insulting the president, while introducing changes that would take weakened the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK). According to Freedom House's 2020 Freedom in the Globe democracy index, Indonesia is considered "Partly Free," with a Global Freedom Score of 61 (out of a possible 100). This rating has dropped over the four years under Jokowi from 65 in 2017 to 64 in 2018 and to 62 in 2019. The country's current score for civil liberties is 31 (out of lx), some other regress from 34 in 2018 and 32 in 2019. It is clearer that Jokowi is not ideologically wedded to democracy and is willing to circumvent certain freedoms in order to pursue his developmentalist calendar.
While the ceremonious-military split is rarely clear cut, it is even more blurred in Republic of indonesia…
Among this properties of autonomous recidivism, it appears in that location is a trend that the military is gaining greater ground in the civil-military balance, with a shift away from civilian dominance. While the civil-military divide is rarely clear cut, it is even more blurred in Republic of indonesia with several former uniformed officers in civilian posts and even current uniformed officers taking up some roles. The prominence of the military does little to entrench ideas publicly about the subordination of military to democratic civilian authority. Rather, it promotes the ideas of military competence, fifty-fifty if retired officers no longer clothing a uniform.
Indonesian civil-military relations are overwhelmingly characterized by continuity of prominent figures from erstwhile President Suharto'southward 1967-1998 New Order regime who remain in or appointed by Jokowi to influential positions, such as ministers and advisors. During the New Order, the Indonesian war machine had a pervasive presence in land diplomacy, including mandated seats in politics, management of country-owned enterprises, control of information and media, and a militarized approach to internal security. This was legitimated nether a doctrine known as "dual function" (dwi fungsi), which ended one time Suharto stepped down in May 1998 and the war machine exited politics. Afterwards the New Order, the transition to democracy was popularly known in Indonesia as reformasi ("reformation"), during which public trust in institutions such equally the parliament and courts was painstakingly rebuilt and corruption rooted out, while the military and constabulary underwent limited structural and cultural reforms.
While the military's influence is not new, Jokowi's lack of familiarity not just with security affairs simply his lack of background from the political and military elite has necessitated the active courting of relationships with power brokers in the war machine. Many of the New Guild's figures remain wealthy and politically continued, albeit in a autonomous setting. The nigh prominent instance of this has been the always-expanding role of former Lieutenant General Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, a former business partner of the president, who is now coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment, his second portfolio in Jokowi's Cabinets. Perhaps the most intriguing was the appointment of Jokowi'southward balloter rival Prabowo Subianto as defense force minister. Under Prabowo, sometime officers from the Ground forces special forces (Kopassus) who were implicated in kidnappings between 1997 and 1998 have as well been promoted to the Defense Ministry. This continued participation of the military in politics and business concern has led to a form of de facto "dual role."
Electric current civil-war machine relations are also marked past intergenerational connections to the New Order. For instance, the one-time head of the state intelligence agency (BIN), retired full general A.M. Hendropriyono, is the father-in-law of the current ground forces master, Andika Perkasa, who could potentially be promoted to chief of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Luhut's son-in-law Major General Maruli Simanjuntak was appointed caput of the Presidential Security Strength in 2018. The upshot of this is the entrenchment of influence of cardinal figures and a continuation of narrow interests and values in the upper echelons of the war machine hierarchy.
Another characteristic is the ongoing presence of the regular army's territorial command system, which Jokowi has leveraged as a source of labor. In this system, the military machine construction mirrors civilian governance structures from the provincial to the village level. In the past, this has functioned as a means of gathering intelligence confronting potential insurrections. Between 2014 and 2017, the Jakarta-based Middle for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Indonesia) plant that the military and Defence Ministry signed 133 deals with ministries and other groups for non just basic military training in some cases but recruiting soldiers equally teachers and rural evolution projects. The dismantling of the territorial command system was debated after reformasi but successive presidents take had petty appetite for this reform. Jokowi's increased reliance on this arrangement farther encourages army dominance by virtue of the number of personnel required and related wages as well as maintaining close rapport betwixt this service and the people.
What's driving current civil-military relations?
The near of import factor in Indonesia's recent pattern of civil-military relations is the president. When elected to ability in 2014, Jokowi's humble, not-elite, not-military background gave him an outsider status. Some of his anti-abuse policies espoused and can-do runway record during his local government days raised expectations, both within the land and outside, that he would bring a reformist wave at the national level. Such was not meant to be. While not a strongman himself, he shares increasingly illiberal inclinations with strongman populists and thus, according to Edward Aspinall, appears to be "a leader who seems made for this moment." One such inclination is to increasingly rely on the war machine, making Indonesia "remarkably in tune with our current zeitgeist." Keen to nourish to infrastructural development affairs, he has been comfortable delegating security matters to trusted military and police figures. In both of his terms, he has appointed a one-time army general as defence force minister. This pattern of reliance on both retired and active military figures has intensified during his tenure. Fabricated Supriatma recently argued that Jokowi also relies on the law equally both a security and political strength, who have appeared to have actively assisted in silencing the president's critics.
Jokowi'southward ties with the military are also indispensable every bit political capital letter, giving him access to an influential group and popular system. He has prudently courted diverse factions of the army. These might be pragmatic choices to consolidate his power and encourage political stability, assuasive him to focus on his agenda. However, as my Brookings colleague Tom Pepinsky astutely observes, Jokowi's "skillful instincts based on beginning-hand experience with urban center politics could never exist replicated across a state this big with governance problems this complex." His lack of ideological commitment to republic or liberalism means his choices are "non always the all-time choices for Indonesian commonwealth."
A second contributing factor is the Indonesian military machine, especially its culture and territorial presence. Since reformasi, formal legislative changes have moved the military machine out from politics and into a more than traditional security function. During the administration of Jokowi'southward predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono , a focus on external activities such as peacekeeping also helped to further this shift in identity. Nonetheless, the war machine, especially older officers, have tenaciously held onto the mindset that they are the "guardians of the nation." The military's territorial construction, which was never reformed afterward 1998, and community service program, where soldiers undertake activities like teaching in classrooms, entrench the military'southward identity as "people's ground forces" in the eyes of both the public and itself. These factors bring military personnel into constant contact with daily affairs at the village-level, beyond the archipelago. This social engagement redresses logistical shortfalls for poorer communities in remote areas but tin also encourage rent-seeking behaviors.
Many in the military, both active and retired officers, continue to believe they are more capable than civilians in both armed forces and civilian roles. According to these officers, technocrats such as former president B.J. Habibie, who was seen as responsible for the "loss" of East Timor, are non to exist trusted. While this mindset is not every bit pervasive among younger officers, the consequent presence of older officers in influential, not-military positions signals to both the military and the Indonesian public that this state of affairs is "normal." In some ways it resembles the New Guild's civilisation of war machine omnipresence, admitting in a contemporary democratic context.
As a result of the military's omnipresence, particularly in Cabinet roles, retired officers have a platform to disseminate their beliefs and values more vocally under Jokowi. While not all of these values undermine land or democratic institutions, all the same, muting public debate on the army-led communist purges of 1965–1966 curtails freedom of oral communication and circumvents attempts at accountability. According to the military, Republic of indonesia must remain vigilant against "latent" threats of communism, justifying a continued internal security function. Indeed, armed services and police-led confiscation of books in 2018 and public statements by armed forces leaders nearly the persistence of a communist threat in contemporary Republic of indonesia demonstrate that the military are still able to control public discourse. Jokowi willingly reinforces the armed forces'south narrative when politically convenient. During the military's 73rd birthday celebrations in 2018, the president played to his audience at the Armed Forces Headquarters, warning of the threat posed past the legacies of 1965. Despite promising during his 2014 campaign and over again in 2019 to address unresolved human rights problems including the 1965 killings, his administration has produced few results.
The 3rd of import driver of these civil-military trends is societal perceptions. One of the signs of deconsolidation can be a loss of belief in democratic values and instead, an increase in preference for "disciplinarian alternatives." New enquiry conducted in Indonesia has shown that republic enjoys support as an abstract concept only Indonesians are non necessarily wedded to liberal values. According to the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) 2016, 70% of respondents said democracy is always preferable, with only 16% answering absolutism as preferable. Nevertheless, boosted questions reveal a more nuanced motion picture. Of those surveyed, 8% said "democracy more important than economic evolution," showing that, under certain weather condition of hardship, well-nigh all Indonesians might be willing to forgo autonomous rights in return for the promise of economic prosperity. These societal perceptions are of import, peculiarly equally the COVID-nineteen continues to put farther pressure level on the economy and health system.
Looking more than specifically at the military'south role in governance, the ABS 2016 plant that 38% of Indonesians surveyed "strongly agree" or "concur" that "the Army should come up in to govern the land," 2nd only behind 54% in Thailand. The figure is down from 43% in 2011 merely all the same represents a meaning portion of those surveyed. Despite a history of military rule, various national surveys conducted beyond Republic of indonesia over the past five years take shown consistently loftier levels of public trust in the war machine, over other institutions including the president and the popular Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The war machine scored an approving rating of 70.7% in a recent study that polled community satisfaction with government bodies during the first 100 days of Jokowi'southward 2nd term.
In addition to these domestic factors, there are international drivers shaping civil-armed forces relations. As China'south increasingly brazen incursions into Indonesia'due south sectional economic zone (EEZ) have become even more high-profile in the Indonesian media than in previous years, in that location are greater public calls for protecting sovereignty. While Republic of indonesia'due south military modernization program is nevertheless underway, further maritime upgrades are sorely needed for the air force and navy. Even so modernizing the armed forces is a double-edged sword: it means assigning that responsibility, budget and, potentially, political credit to Jokowi's former rival, Prabowo. Jokowi will also demand to strike a careful residuum between the services, given the land forces' historical say-so in the military. Appointing a primary of military from the army, specially Lieutenant Full general Andika Perkasa (the son-in-police force of a key advisor), could exist i such way of placating that service.
Indonesia's experience likewise appears to align with global trends in autonomous regression, manifested in the ballot of less liberal figures who increasingly plough to the military and police for internal matters. In Brazil, a 2017 poll showed 43% support temporary revival for military control, before the 2018 ballot of ultra-conservative former army helm Jair Bolsonaro. In add-on to other portfolios, Bolsanaro appointed former ground forces generals to the posts of defense minister and institutional security government minister. In the Philippines, where the defense force minister is also a retired army general (albeit seen as capable and moderate), latest polls show 80% approval rating for the hot-headed president Rodrigo Duterte, who has used the police force aggressively in a "war on drugs," which has killed over eight,500 people according to the Philippine authorities and closer to 27,000 people according to human rights groups. There is a demonstration consequence of increasing the presence of such figures in authorities and the use of military machine in non-security roles elsewhere globally, resulting in the weakening of norms regarding noncombatant control, as well equally fewer calls for the protection of liberal democratic rights.
COVID-19 tipping the balance
Like many countries, the Jokowi assistants has deployed the military machine, alongside the constabulary, to promote public health and enforce social distancing policies amidst the COVID-xix pandemic. As of mid-December 2020, Indonesia has had roughly 640,000 confirmed cases and 20,000 deaths. However, these might not reverberate the true extent of the virus in the archipelago as many Indonesians fearfulness the social stigma from a positive examination result. Military figures have also been prominent at the national level, including the controversial health minister, retired army full general Terawan Agus Putranto, known for attributing Indonesia's depression infection rates at the beginning of the pandemic to God, and the head of the National Agency for Disaster Prevention (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB), Lieutenant General Doni Monardo, an active duty officer who is besides main of Indonesia'due south Coronavirus Disease Response Acceleration Chore Force.
It is not unusual for the military to be involved in humanitarian relief efforts and it is also early to tell the exact touch on on ceremonious-armed services relations. A study published in May past CSIS Indonesia found that while the government'due south response to the pandemic involved many military assets, it was only "partly militarized" in the degree to which military officers are in positions of influence with regard to both policy decision-making and implementation. However, the military' role has intensified in recent months, particularly with a presidential pedagogy issued in August ordering that the military support local authorities, aslope the police, in monitoring public health protocols. The president too installed Army master General Andika Perkasa and National Constabulary deputy chief Commander General Gatot Boil Pramono equally deputy heads of the COVID-19 treatment and national economic recovery committee.
The pandemic's wider impacts, on the economy, the health system, and social cohesion, provide further potential for an intensified war machine role.
However, the pandemic'south wider impacts, on the economic system, the health system, and social cohesion, provide further potential for an intensified military function. Before the pandemic, the country enjoyed Gdp growth rates of 5% per annum. Now, the economy is suffering not only capital letter flight but struggling to finance COVID-19 response policies and to soften the blow of one of the most astringent economic crises since the Great Low. Poor and low-income families are under even greater strain. Aside from the loftier death charge per unit among patients, the alarming number of deaths amidst health workers weakens Republic of indonesia's already overburdened and under-financed health organization.
COVID-19 has also intensified anti-Prc sentiment domestically and regionally, which has heightened resentment towards Indonesians of Chinese heritage who take oft been targets of racist attacks in the past. The more than recent and loftier-profile attacks on Republic of indonesia'southward Chinese customs came in the wake of massive protests in Jakarta in late 2016 against the city's ethnically Chinese and Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known every bit Ahok) who was accused of blaspheming against the Quran. The protests and Ahok'due south subsequent confidence in May 2017 are seen by some observers as further signs of social polarization and the "weaponisation" of irreverence laws, further fracturing religious pluralism.
Anxieties most task security in the pandemic era have heightened dissatisfaction with the regime. In early October, tens of thousands of workers and students protested in major capital cities against the administration'south attempts to pass "omnibus" law reforms, which lawmakers argue will make investment through deregulation. Protestors say the reforms strip away workers' rights and environmental protection. These kinds of potential civil unrest provides further justification for the military to be involved, albeit aslope the police force, given its historic internal security office. Despite announcing cuts to the defence budget due to fiscal pressures due to COVID-19 before in 2020, in August the finance minister announced a xvi.two% increment in the 2021 budget, over the original 2020 defense budget of IDR 117.ix trillion (about $8.iv million), to assist run across modernization targets. In brusque, the electric current weather of COVID-exacerbated economic inequality and social polarization, coupled with a well-resourced military, could farther shift norms around the armed forces'south domestic office.
The road ahead: policy implications and recommendations
While the military has continued to play an important part in post-reformasi Republic of indonesia, under the Jokowi assistants, the domestic functions and political prominence of the war machine have flourished. Jokowi's successor will either come up from a military background or demand to follow his precedent of appeasing an important grouping of power brokers. Given the deep-held public trust in the armed forces and its culture, particularly amidst older officers, this trend of accommodation will be hard to abort. Thus, not only will Indonesia need financial support due to COVID-19, amid Indonesia'due south democratic regression, information technology is critical to ensure the safeguarding of other institutions that protect democratic rights and concord officials accountable, such every bit a complimentary and active press, contained courts, and fair elections.
As the armed services's role in domestic diplomacy intensified over the past v years, accelerating during the pandemic, the limits and scope of its involvement in civilian matters must exist communicated clearly to the public and monitored closely, especially once pandemic conditions ease. To residue perceptions of military machine competence in civilian roles, a stronger and ameliorate supported civilian bureaucracy is needed. Like all ministerial portfolios, investment in education will be strained by COVID-nineteen recovery funding. Since boosting Indonesia'south human capital is a stated priority of Jokowi'south second term administration, didactics tin can be supported equally a priority expanse for investment and policy development within the country and with external assistance.
As alluded to before, another potential implication from the electric current situation is the strengthening of political continuing of armed forces figures, especially Prabowo Subianto. Depending on perceptions of his track record as defence minister, Prabowo could run again for president in 2024, this time with experience in part. Already the Trump administration has had to adapt Prabowo's visit to Washington by easing his travel ban, smoothing ties ahead of a time to come rise. Thus far, while some analysts say it is as well early to tell, the public has perceived Jokowi as having poorly managed the land'due south early on response against COVID-xix, which could undermine perceptions of competent civilian leadership. By the end of his term as defense minister, without whatever serious gaffes, Prabowo and his retired military advisors could sally as more significant political players even if he does not run over again.
Overall, while Indonesia has made a remarkable transformation from absolutism to balloter democracy, several of the underlying currents from New Order civil-armed services relations take rolled back some of its liberal graphic symbol. This is supported by broader ambivalence to liberal norms among Indonesians and loftier levels of trust in an older and more familiar establishment. Indonesia's power to steer its democracy back into a healthy state will exist hampered by its economic recovery and public wellness pressures, the extent of which is yet to be truly revealed. Some steps that partners might take to abort the farther rollback of Republic of indonesia'southward democratic gains would be to ensure the vibrancy of actors other than the military or police force. These include a potent civilian defense hierarchy, civil society, the university sector and the media. Many of these groups played a pivotal role in shaking upwardly Indonesia'south political organization leading up to Suharto'due south fall and later on, and will need bolstering in the coming years. This could come non just via funding but through capacity-edifice, enquiry back up, training and external networks. The land has transformed itself once—just where will it head next?
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Acknowledgments:
Ted Reinert edited this newspaper.
Source: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/generals-gaining-ground-civil-military-relations-and-democracy-in-indonesia/
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